Kalabagh: Need for Informed Debate
BY ALY ERCELAWN & OMAR ASGHAR KHAN
PROPOSALS for a large-scale irrigation and power dam at Kalabagh evoke fierce opposition in some areas, even as the idea receives strong support from other areas of Pakistan. The recent Islamabad seminar of the Society for Citizen's Rights offered much for reflection by both sides of the divide. We believe these discussions merit wider circulation that enable citizens and government to move away from shrill provincial confrontation towards a national dialogue. Only then can we have a consensus based on a vision of just and equitable development.
For us, a number of important lessons emerged from the presentations. First, the
controversy surrounding Kalabagh is fundamental and wide-ranging: from the very
need for any large- scale dam to the ability of effective mitigation and fair
compensation for adverse environmental and social impacts. Second, in
consequence, opposition to the dam is both intensive and extensive. With the
formation of the World Dams Commission, Kalabagh is highly likely to include
international scrutiny in the near future. Third, information gaps remain an
obstacle to informed debate and discussion, in part because of the very low
credibility of government and its agencies, both federal and provincial.
Proponents of the Kalabagh dam argue that it is essential to meet the needs of
cheap energy and cheap food for a rapidly growing population. Some also argue
that Kalabagh will increase the useful life of Mangla and Tarbela dams, through
reducing siltation in these dams. There are a number of reasons why dissenters
remain unconvinced on the urgency of building Kalabagh. These include, first,
the well-known fact of a substantial surplus of power capacity to continue in
the near future, both through private thermal plants and the under-construction
Ghazi-Barotha hydro project.
Second, no evidence has been presented to establish that unsubsidised costs of
future hydel power will compare favourably to other sources of energy. Third, is
the absence of systematic comparisons of the cost of Kalabagh water with the
cost of alternative ways of increasing deliveries of water in the irrigation
system and of reducing waste in its use. Fourth, if at all, another hydel power
is to be commissioned, there are no apparently overriding reasons to reject the
cheaper Basha dam in favour of Kalabagh dam. Finally, there is a curious
fatalism about our population growth, despite the obvious success of our
neighbours in addressing this issue.
Discussions at the seminar clearly established the presence of contentious
adverse impacts of Kalabagh. First, it remains doubtful whether water flows in
the Indus are adequate to fill up the dam in most years, unless the existing
Water Accord is violated or modified. Second, if fresh water flows below Kotri
are reduced, the impact upon people who depend upon agriculture and fisheries in
coastal Sindh is highly likely to be disastrous. Fudging of data by Wapda, and
the refusal to undertake comprehensive, credible studies only adds to the alarm.
Third, people of upper Sindh are unlikely to be easily coerced by Islamabad to
reducing water flows even further below what they already lose through blatant
violations of the Water Accord. Fourth, when irrigation supplies increase, the
cumulative impact upon already high levels of water-logging and salinity in the
Indus
Basin could be severe. The National Drainage
Programme will take many years to drain water from the basin to the sea, and
even that is highly problematic in view of likely opposition from coastal
districts. No alternatives to draining the effluent into sea have been explored.
Fifth, there are the well-known fears of people in areas of NWFP about an
increased risk of devastation from floods. There are heightened by fears of
increased water logging and salinity in fertile areas surrounding the proposed
reservoir. Proposed technical modifications are unconvincing to them. Sixth,
there is issue of implementing fair compensation and satisfactory resettlement
of the thousands of men, women, and children who will certainly lose houses and
lands submerged by the dam. Major and continuing failures in Tarbela, Ghazi-Barotha
and Chotiari inspire little confidence in government.
The seminar also raised fundamental issues about funding the construction of
Kalabagh dam. First, there is little likelihood that government can find
counterpart funds necessary to attract international aid in the near future.
Whatever we may wish, neither the burden of debt servicing nor of defence is
likely to disappear. Second, if private infrastructure funds are attracted to
finance the dam at the usual high returns, it is doubtful whether the project
remains financially or economically viable when all unavoidable adverse impacts
are fully compensated and close to a hundred thousands persons resettled. Third,
will we then have to submit to wholesale privatisation of the irrigation and
drainage system, as proposed by the World Bank in the National Drainage
Programme? Fourth, if the beneficiaries of the dam are highly localised, there
appears to no compelling reason to fund the dam through tax burdens on current
and future generations of the entire nation.
The most important lesson of the Seminar is the urgent need for broad-based,
public consultations on crucial issues of moral and legal rights to life and
livelihood that surround claims to water. Any prior interventions by the state
and its donors which affect historic claims to the Indus
waters will be largely viewed as arrogant and oppressive repudiation of such
fundamental rights in a democratic federation of communities and citizens. Only
in recognising this can we seriously begin work towards forging a national
consensus on whether or not to build Kalabagh or any other dam. Meetings of the
Council of Common Interests will remain a poor substitute for responsible and
responsive governance.