Kalabagh Dam -- Development or disaster?

Iftikhar Ahmad

For the past so many years of its planning and designing, the objectives and goals of Kalabagh Dam (KBD) have been shrouded in secrecy, and the Federal Government’s blind following of the project, against the wishes of the three provinces of the federation, has made it the most controversial issue of national integrity.

 The project is being pleaded as a turning point in the direction of national development, whereas the provinces see it as step towards the diversion of common resources towards the development of one province (Punjab), leaving all the rest to the possible negative impacts perceived from the project.

 The matter becomes more complex in the present state of better possible alternatives, having greater development potentials and lesser negative impacts on any of the federating units of Pakistan.

One of the reasons for creating controversy and difference of opinion on the project is attributed to WAPDA’s failure to adequately consult the provinces at the project planning and design stage, since the provinces were kept in complete darkness about the design parameters of the dam, till the completion of its detailed design in 1984-85.

To further fuel the issue, statements from responsible officials of the federal government, the Punjab and WAPDA, first declared Kalabagh Dam as only a storage dam to offset the storage loss of Tarbela and Mangla Dams, due to sedimentation. Followed by reasons of rise in fuel costs and the consequent increased costs due to thermal generation, pleading the ultimate requirement of cheap hydel power. And, to further confuse the issue, the project was declared to have plans for a Left and Right Bank canals for irrigation purposes.

In the backdrop of all these events, the role of beneficiaries/affectees has been totally ignored. For which, they have every right to ask for the public disclosure of all the relevant facts regarding selection criteria, planning parameters, design guidelines, cost estimates, environmental and socio-economic assessments, government’s priorities, and financing mechanism of the planned construction. And it becomes more important for projects towards the harnessing of shared water resources, like that of River Indus, and for the equitable distribution of their benefits among the federating units as well as their short and long term impacts on their individual as well as collective lives.

Brief Introduction of Kalabagh Dam Project

The Kalabagh Dam (KBD) is proposed to be located on the River Indus at about 120 miles downstream of Tarbela Dam, 92 miles downstream the confluence of Kabul and Indus Rivers and 16 miles upstream of the existing Jinnah Barrage. The site is a narrow and deep channel extending over 5-mile distance where the river is about 1,300 feet wide.

According to the PC-II of the Project "KBD was initiated by GOP in 1953, and until 1973, the project was basically considered as a storage project for meeting the irrigation needs, and consequently, rapid increases in the cost of energy have greatly enhanced the priority of KBD as a power project".

The project planning report, circulated in March 84, tried to establish the technical and economic feasibility of the project, and the detailed designs/tender documents, commenced in March 84, and were completed by December 1985.

The feasibility study and documentation have cost the GOP around one billion rupees so far.

According to one of WAPDA’s latest briefs on the KBD Project, the dam and its objectives are described in the following words:

"It is expected to be a 260 ft high structure and would create a reservoir 6.1 million acres feet (MAF) of usable storage. The annual generation of energy would amount to about 11,200 GWh, generated by hydro power plant of 2400 MW capacity. This capacity may ultimately be increased to 3600 MW, making KBD one of the largest hydro generation dams in Asia. The total project cost covering civil and power facilities, as estimated by the consultants at June 1987 prices, will be about US $ 5.153 billion, including the cost of interest during construction, customs duties, taxes and price contingencies"

(Note: At the present day’s construction costs, the dam is expected to cost around US $ 8 billion)

Another WAPDA release "WAPDA Projects in Brief" of January 1986, describes the project as:
"Kalabagh Dam is a multipurpose project to be built across the River Indus. Basically, it is a power project which aims at accelerating the tempo of economic development in Pakistan".

Briefly, in WAPDA’s terms, the proposed KBD has the following aims:

1. To generate large amounts of low cost hydro electric power near major load centers, and supply the existing grid for meeting the growing power demand of agriculture, industrial and domestic consumers. In addition, it will increase the energy output of the existing Tarbela scheme by permitting the conjunctive operation of the two reservoirs.
2. To provide additional storage on the Indus River, and thus reduce the exiting system shortfalls in irrigation requirements.
3. To provide additional regulation on the River Indus, and thus provide better system control and management for supplying assured, adequate and timely irrigation water for crops.
4. To compensate for the storage loss due to the silting up of exiting reservoirs till such time that their substitutes, (presently planned) are actually available.
5. To eliminate and control the flood peaks in the River Indus so as to minimize flood hazards downstream.
6. To increase Pakistan’s capability to manage its water distribution and power generation systems through the conjunctive operation of Tarbela and KBD reservoir

It is believed by WAPDA that " the conjunctive operation of Kalabagh Dam will enhance Tarbela’s generation capacity to 336 million units of energy and 600 MW of peaking power. Which will increase the share of hydel power on the national grid, thus controlling the overall cost of power generation, alongwith the reduction in thermal generation to result in savings in fuel import".

 Distinctive Characteristics of KBD Project (Ref: WAPDA Reports)

The project has two spillways on the Right Bank for the disposal of floodwater, having a total maximum discharge capacity of 2 million cusecs.

On the left bank is the powerhouse, which is connected to 12 tunnel conduits, each 36 ft in diameter, with ultimate power generation capacity of 3600 MW.

The KBD reservoir will extend 92 miles up the Indus from the dam site and 36 miles up the Soan River, and about 10 miles up the Kabul River from the Kabul-Indus confluence, at its normal retention level, at which the reservoir area would be 164 sq. miles in total.

The total cultivable affected land under the reservoir, according to WAPDA’s figures, will be 35000 acres, out of which 27500 acres falls under the reservoir and will be permanently acquired (24500 acres in Punjab and 3000 acres in NWFP); while the floods (of recurrence interval of 1 in 5 yrs) will temporarily submerge 7500 acres of land (6000 acres in Punjab and 1500 acres in NWFP). The land will be taken on easement, under which the title of the land will remain with the owners and it will be available for cultivation during normal season flows.

According to WAPDA, the operation schedule will allow the reservoir to be emptied upto the 890-ft above MSL once every year, and will allow one season cropping in about 14000 acres of land, lying above that level.
According to them, out of the whole-submerged land under the reservoir, the total irrigated land is 3000 acres (2900 acres in Punjab and 100 acres in NWFP).

As per the 1991 WAPDA estimates, the total population displaced by the KBD will be 83000 (48500 will be from Punjab and 34500 will be from NWFP).

To compensate the dam displaced people; WAPDA has a plan to offer a minimum of 12.5 acres land as land compensation per land-owning family, for which 74000 acres of irrigated land will be required.

To efficiently clear the deposited sediment from the reservoir, the dam is proposed to have an orifice spillway having its crest level 40-ft below the minimum elevation 835-ft level.

It is believed by WAPDA’s experts that the operational rules specifying the retention of reservoir at the minimum level of El.825-ft above MSL in the month of June and upto 20th July, will enable direct sluicing of the silt laden early floods, as well as averting the risks of flooding in the upstream areas of the reservoir.

Salient Features of KBD Project 

References:

1. Rashed A. Saeed, KBD Project; A Scientific Analysis, Print Associates Int’l Islamabad, 1995
2. Kazi Abrar, KBD The Sindh Case, Creative Communications, Hyderabad, 1998

Expected Benefits of the KBD Project

The Kalabagh Dam (KBD) has been pleaded by WAPDA as the only possible choice for saving the food and energy starved nation of Pakistan. In this respect, it has worked out the following beneficial aspects of the project:

Enhancement in the Irrigation Water Supply

The dam is designed to have a left bank canal, off-taking from the left bank high level outlet works of KBD. It will have a capacity of 15,000 cusecs, will be 170 miles long, and will lift about 6.65 MAF water annually from the Kalabagh Dam reservoir.
Through this canal, the province of Punjab wishes to irrigate its 371,000 acres of land, on both the banks, of Mianwali, Khushab and Jehlum Districts.

To meet the irrigation water requirements, the canal is planned to provide 0.78 MAF in Rabi and 1.23 MAF in Kharif to the new cultivated area, and will discharge the balance 4.64 MAF water into Jehlum at Rasul Barrage to meet shortage of Mangla command, thus fulfilling water shortages in the Mangla command.

Another canal was proposed on the Right Bank of the dam, to irrigate certain areas of NWFP (Pukhtunkhwa), but it has been discarded now, because WAPDA considers it unfeasible.

 Enhancement in the Power Generation Capacity

 The KBD is expected to have 8 units of 300 MW capacity initially, which will be ultimately increased to 12 units of 300 MW capacity. The power expected to be generated out of the KBD is as under:

It is further believed by WAPDA that KBD will generate 336 million units of energy and 600 MW of peaking power by working in conjunction with Tarbela.

(Reference: WAPDA Brief to Senate Standing Committee on Water and Power, November 1997)

A Critical Analysis of the KBD Project

A lot has been said, and is still being said, both in favour and against the KBD project, and the debate will continue till a final decision on its fate is achieved.

In this respect, the Federal Government & WAPDA, having all the administrative machinery at their disposal, have conducted a number of studies and organized various seminars, for projecting the beneficial aspects of the project and allay fears against its negative impacts.
On the other hand, enlightened professionals and nationalist organizations have, both individually and collectively, researched on the subject and tried to expose the over-shadowed negative aspects of KBD.

Whereas the few benefits of KBD project have been extensively propagated through the wide publicity campaigns of WAPDA, there has been a need to compile the findings of those unknown researchers, who burnt their midnight oil to expose the multiple destructive capacities of Kalabagh Dam.

Building upon the work done by the said researchers, the following pages will present a critical analysis of the KBD project, so as to enable the reader to assess for himself/herself the ultimate utility of the project to Pakistan.

General Observations on KBD Project

KBD is the only major project in the history of Pakistan, which has been most strongly opposed by the three, out of the four, provinces for various reasons. In this respect, unanimous resolutions have been passed by their elected Provincial Assembles to reject the viability of the project. Also, in the National Assembly and the Senate, the project has been strongly opposed by the elected representatives.

Apart from the technical flaws, making the construction and operation of the project an ultimate disaster, the people of the three provinces have certain reservations against its viability for the integrity of the country, and their common development.

Some of these reservations are described below:

Reservations of NWFP (Pukhtunkhwa)

NWFP objects to the KBD because, a sizable number of its people will be displaced, and a vast area of its land will either be submerged under the reservoir or rendered waterlogged.

 In the original design of KBD, the reservoir elevation was desired at 925-ft above MSL, at which the water level in River Kabul was feared to rise by 2.5-ft at Nowshera, immediately after construction and to the ultimate 9.5-ft after 30 years of the project implementation.

To account for this, and as protection against damages in these areas, WAPDA had proposed to erect 25-ft high dykes around the Kabul River, so as to protect the cities from the water’s spillover.

 However, due to the high risk factor for the flooding eventuality and subsequent drainage problems, the Government of NWFP seriously objected the designs of the project and conducted investigations in 1985 to assess the possible impacts of KBD on the Peshawar valley.

As a result, it was revealed that, at the 925-ft reservoir elevation, the following major impacts were expected to occur:

1. 60000 acres of area will be affected by the 1 in 5 year floods
2. 16 number unprotected villages will be required to be acquired and their population resettled
3. 64933 persons will require resettlement elsewhere.
4. Another 131000 persons will be requiring protection through 24 feet high dykes
5. A total of 28 miles long flood protection dykes will be constructed along the Kabul River, out of which 18 miles length will be specifically required to protect the Nowshera town alone.
6. The dykes retained water was feared to contribute to the overall rise in water table in the immediate vicinity of the reservoir.

 In addition, the following facilities were feared to be permanently submerged in the reservoir in a 1 in 100 year flood, and therefore required relocation:
i. 20.45 km of National Highway, 2 km Nowshera-Mardan road,

ii. 10 km Nizampur Attock road, 25 km Pir Sabak-Jehangira road
v. 6.92-km Railway line between Khairabad - Nowshera
vi. 5.43 km railway line between Nowshera - Mardan
vii. Bridge at Khushal Garh
viii. Khairabad Bridge at Attock required strengthening and modifications
ix. Jehangira Bridge required raising by 15 ft
x. Nowshera Railway Bridge required raising by 6-ft
xi. Nowshera Mardan Bridge required raising by 6-ft
xi. Telecommunication, power lines and gas lines also required relocation

 In the light of these findings, the Government of NWFP requested WAPDA to revise the project.

 Lately, WAPDA has revised the designs and reduced the reservoir elevation to 915-ft above MSL in July 1986. And declared the designs to be safe against all the evils of the previous design.

 Whereas, the validity of WAPDA’s statement of a mere 10-ft reduction in reservoir height to solve all the problems is questionable and worth detailed investigation, the people of NWFP doubt the predictions of WAPDA’s experts due to their previously ill-conceived designs of KBD, and hold strong apprehensions against the real objectives of the project.

They, therefore, still believe that:

1. The dam will raise the water level of River Indus throughout the Attock gorge, right through the Haro river confluence and upto the Akora Khattak on Kabul River. And resultantly, the Nowshera City, inhibited by 200,000 people falling on both the left and right banks of Kabul River, will be under severe threat of flooding. And in the long term of about 50 years time, the Nowshera City and its adjoining areas will become waterlogged swamplands, due to the seepage from the raised water level.
2. The Mardan and Swabi SCARP projects, covering 123,000 acres of irrigated land, will face certain threat of failure, because of their outfalls being lower than the high flood levels in KBD reservoir.
3. WAPDA has prepared a water release pattern of the post KBD irrigation supplies, which will have an adverse impact on the CRBC project, as it does not provide enough water for undertaking the lift components of CRBC in future. Similarly, the CRBC is also likely to be affected for long periods during the construction of the project and during the first ponding of the reservoir

Therefore, in the absence of an independent assessment of the damages at the 915-ft reservoir level, and with no-trust in WAPDA’s claims of all-well, the people of NWFP take the previously arrived figures of social and economic costs as an eye opener on the viability of the project.

People still believe that the mere 10-ft reduction in reservoir level will have a negligible mitigating impact in taking care of the colossal injury to NWFP.

A detailed discussion on the various dimensions of the project follows later.

Reservations of Baluchistan 

The largest province of Pakistan, Baluchistan, does not touch River Indus and is not a riparian in the strictest sense. Still the Pat Feeder canal from Guddu Barrage, with 3400 cusecs of water, irrigates about 300,000 acres in the province. And with a recent request of Baluchistan Government to remodel the Pat Feeder canal, the flow is further expected to be increased to 6000 cusecs, irrigating a further 200,000 acres.

Baluchistan’s opposition to KBD is therefore based on its apprehension that future requests for more water from River Indus will meet little success if KBD over stretches the demand of water in Indus River system.

In addition, with the revised distribution of water in the post KBD scenario, Baluchistan fears a further reduction in its share of irrigation water usage, which is already very low.

Reservations of Sindh

Sindhis believe that KBD left bank canal will divert the waters of Indus to Rasul-Qadirabad sector in the upper reaches of Punjab, and the whole of River Indus waters will be left to cater to the needs of Punjab only, whenever their is shortage of water in Jehlum, or in the eventuality of India appropriating all the waters of Jehlum, or Chenab or both

Sindh, which is a lower riparian of River Indus, has constantly felt threatened by Punjab and has bitterly disputed the figures of water availability advanced by WAPDA, citing legal, economic, ecological, geomorphologic and many other reasons for opposing KBD.

From the past experience of the operation of Taunsa-Punjnad and Chashma-Jehlum canal, people in Sindh perceive that Punjab plans to allow the civil works or the canal system to be constructed as projects of national survival and run the surplus water for a few years to establish precedence and develop water users, who will then apply pressure to keep the water supply running. Later, when the water rights are well established in Punjab, they can force the lower riparian (or don’t even ask) to accept the fait accompli and keep the water supply running since the tap is in the hands of the upper riparian.

Therefore, Sindh’s strongly opposes the construction of KBD.

Basic Planning Drawbacks in KBD Project

The KBD project suffers from a multitude of planning and design drawbacks, which makes it the least desired development alternative, out of the various development opportunities available in the Indus Basin.

With the KBD as a test case, the following paragraphs exposes the planning capability of WAPDA and the intelligence level of the decision makers at the top, who are adamant to support and propagate the case of a technically unfeasible dam on River Indus.

Unavailability of Enough Water in the Indus River System 

The amount of water flowing through the River Indus has been a point of acute disagreement between the planners of KBD project and other impartial engineers.

To technically analyze the issue, the following table, from the year 1922 to 1991, indicates 69 years maximum flow pattern of the western rivers of Pakistan, measured at rim stations (Indus at KBD, Jehlum at Mangla & Chenab at Marala)

Reference: Surface Water Availability for Further Development, WAPDA, December 1994

From the table five parameters are evident

i. Maximum flow of the 3 western rivers 186.79 MAF evidenced in 1959-60

ii. Minimum flow of the 3 western rivers 100.31 MAF evidenced in 1974-75

iii. Average (per year) flow of the 3 western is 137.27 MAF

iv. 4 out 5 years flow of 3 western rivers is 123.59 MAF

A closer analysis of the flow pattern reveals that super floods occur approximately once in 5 years time, which may jack up the average flow to the respectable 137.27 MAF per year, but in the remaining four years, availability of water remain around 123.59 MAF only, or lower.

In all its calculations of the availability of water for KBD, WAPDA has insisted upon the average flow figures i.e. 137.27 MAF, whereas the criteria for designing a storage dam is of using the 4 out of 5 years flows, giving an 80% probability of water coming down the rivers to enable its storage. By adopting this criteria for our storage reservoirs, we end with a figure of 123.59 MAF available in our Indus River system.

 If in the above table of 69 years flow, the 9 years of exceptionally low flows of less than 120.0 MAF are disregarded, the next consecutive 2 years of low flows are 1931-32 (123.59 MAF) and 1932-33 (125.26 MAF), with an average of 124.4 MAF, which is very close to the 123.59 MAF, the figure of 4 out of 5 years water availability (80% probability flow).

 To support this theory, the US Supreme Court Ruling is " to be available in a practical sense the supply must be fairly dependable, storage dams cannot be filled on expectations of average flows which do not come, nor on recollections of unusual flows which have passed down the stream in previous year".

Considering the Indus Water Apportionment Accord to be the benchmark, the simple and correct arithmetic of our water resources availability in the Indus River System should read as follows:

 Availability of Water in 3 Western Rivers (below rim station) 123.59 MAF

Requirement of the 4 Provinces (according to the Water Accord) 114.35 MAF

Release below Kotri (provisionally agreed in Water Accord) 10.00 MAF

 Remainder -0.76 MAF

The negative balance in the calculation shows that, there is virtually not enough water in River Indus, to be stored for usage in later part of any year. And if storage is tried, it will only be at the cost of the downstream riparian, depriving them of their legitimate rights of water use.

Contrary to realizing this fact, WAPDA has been publicizing the news of floods in River Indus and its breaching of protective bunds at various places, to try create a perception that enormous quantities of water go "waste" every year, and that if this water was stored in KBD, Pakistan would not only be saved from the damages of these high flows, but its agriculture would take a giant leap towards self-sufficiency. It has been argued that 34.84 MAF of water pass below the Kotri Barrage every year to the sea, and is therefore going waste.

To clarify the misconception of exceptionally high discharges of 34.84 MAF below Kotri, the following points needs to be closely followed:

1. At present all the barrages and the canals of Pakistan can take about 105 MAF against the allocated 114.35 MAF under the Indus Water Apportionment Accord 1991.
   The remaining 9.35 MAF ends up on its way to the sea through Kotri. And this will eliminate if the irrigation network is completed to accommodate this additional allocated flow.
2. Outflow from the eastern rivers of Sutlej, Beas and Ravi into Indus is about 6.97 MAF. Since all three rivers are committed to India, and with the progressive development going on in India, these flows will be reduced to zero (except in the few years of exceptionally high flood season flows), thereby reducing the Kotri discharges by that amount.
3. As per the Indus Water Treaty, India has also been given an unrestricted use of water to cultivate 1343477 acres from the western rivers, in addition to all the rights of eastern river. India, to date, has utilized 6.75 MAF and will draw another 4.79 MAF from the system, to further reduce the flows at Kotri by that amount.
4. The 34.83 MAF flow to sea is in fact the mean discharge, and is bound to be lower by 10.0 to 14 MAF in any specific year.

The correct calculations in this respect will be:

Waste flows below Kotri Barrage = 34.84 MAF

Less

i. Additional allocations under Indus Water Accord 1991 = 9.35 MAF

ii. India’s flow in the Eastern Rivers = 6.97 MAF

iii. India additional water rights under the Indus Water Treaty = 4.79 MAF

iv. Yearly flow under Kotri barrage (lower by14 MAF than average) = 14.0 MAF

Net available flow below Kotri Barrage = - 0.27 MAF

Hence, the net available water to flow to the sea reduces to a negative balance, leaving nothing for storage into KBD. Therefore, the news of floods "wasting enormous amount of water" does not hold true

Still for people, who consider the flood water to be a mere waste do not realize that there is no mechanical method of removing millions of tons of deposited silt from the river beds of the barrages, and it is the force of water from these high floods that helps in washing away much of the accumulated silt.

References:

KBD; The Sindh Case by Kazi Abrar, 1998

Look before you leap by Abdul Majeed Kazi & A.N.G Abbassi

Geophysical and Geological Environment of Kalabagh Dam
To fully comprehend the KBD impacts in the long run, its geophysical and geological environment alongwith the mechanics of water flow through soils needs to be understood in more detail.

In this respect, two important pointers appear in the topographic view of the proposed site of KBD i.e., the salt range and the location of the five oil fields near the proposed dam site.

To be able to visualize the role of the salt range in the KBD’s feasibility, it is necessary to magnify and elaborate the section of the ground between the Murree thrust and Salt Range thrust. 

Figure of Earth Crust under the Proposed Kalabagh Lake